Bill C-22: An Act respecting lawful access

Bill C-22: An Act respecting lawful access

Tabled in the House of Commons, Arpil 24, 2026

Explanatory Note

Section 4.2 of the Department of Justice Act requires the Minister of Justice to prepare a Charter Statement for every government bill to help inform public and Parliamentary debate on government bills. One of the Minister of Justice’s most important responsibilities is to examine legislation for inconsistency with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms [“the Charter”]. By tabling a Charter Statement, the Minister is sharing some of the key considerations that informed the review of a bill for inconsistency with the Charter. A Statement identifies Charter rights and freedoms that may potentially be engaged by a bill and provides a brief explanation of the nature of any engagement, in light of the measures being proposed.

A Charter Statement also identifies potential justifications for any limits a bill may impose on Charter rights and freedoms. Section 1 of the Charter provides that rights and freedoms may be subject to reasonable limits if those limits are prescribed by law and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. This means that Parliament may enact laws that limit Charter rights and freedoms. The Charter will be violated only where a limit is not demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society.

A Charter Statement is intended to provide legal information to the public and Parliament on a bill’s potential effects on rights and freedoms that are neither trivial nor too speculative. It is not intended to be a comprehensive overview of all conceivable Charter considerations. Additional considerations relevant to the constitutionality of a bill may also arise in the course of Parliamentary study and amendment of a bill. A Statement is not a legal opinion on the constitutionality of a bill.

Charter Considerations

The Minister of Justice has examined Bill C-22, An Act respecting lawful access, for any inconsistency with the Charter pursuant to his obligation under section 4.1 of the Department of Justice Act. This review involved consideration of the objectives and features of the bill.

What follows is a non-exhaustive discussion of the ways in which Bill C-22 potentially engages the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter. It is presented to assist in informing the public and Parliamentary debate on the bill. It does not include an exhaustive description of the entire bill, but rather focuses on those elements relevant for the purposes of a Charter Statement.

A number of measures in the bill could have potential effects under the following provisions of the Charter.

Part 1 – Timely Access to Data and Information

Part 1would make a number of amendments to the Criminal Code, Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, in respect of timely access to data and information by law enforcement and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).

Criminal Code

Confirmation of service demand

The bill would authorize an officer to make a demand to a telecommunications service provider, to confirm whether the person provides or has provided telecommunications services to a particular subscriber, client, account or identifier. These demands could only be made if the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence has been or will be committed, and the information will assist in the investigation of the offence. As this power would enable police to obtain information linked to a person, it may engage section 8 of the Charter.

The following considerations support the consistency of these amendments with section 8. The information sought would be limited to basic information about the nature of telecommunications services provided, and would not reveal the contents of any communications, or any other details in relation to the services provided. For greater certainty, the demand could not be made if it would reveal medical information or information subject to solicitor-client privilege or the professional secrecy of advocates or notaries. The confirmation of service demand would require “reasonable suspicion,” which is a recognized threshold for certain searches in the criminal context, and which would prevent the power from being used for “fishing expeditions.” A demand to provide information may not be issued to the person under investigation. The person who receives the demand would be able to challenge the demand in front of a judge, who would be able to revoke or vary the demand. The information provided would be used primarily in obtaining further search warrants or production orders, which would be subject to the applicable thresholds set out in legislation, as well as judicial oversight. Applying successfully for a search warrant or production order would usually require officers to combine any information obtained through these amendments with relevant information obtained through other lawful means.

Request for information

The bill clarifies, for greater certainty, that no confirmation of service demand is necessary for a police officer to ask a telecommunications service provider to voluntarily provide the information that could be the subject of a confirmation of service demand. As this provision governs the circumstances under which police may obtain information linked to a person, it may engage section 8 of the Charter.

The following considerations support the consistency of this provision with section 8. The information sought would be basic information about the nature of services provided, and would not reveal the contents of any communications, or any other details in relation to the services provided. The information provided would be used primarily in obtaining further search warrants or production orders, which would be subject to the applicable thresholds set out in legislation, as well as judicial oversight. Applying successfully for a search warrant or production order would usually require officers to combine any information obtained through these amendments with relevant information obtained through other lawful means. This amendment clarifies that the new demand power does not displace the existing ability of police to ask questions about basic information such as the existence of a service relationship.

Production order – Subscriber Information

The bill would allow a judge to issue an order, to a person who provides services to the public, to prepare and produce a document containing the subscriber information that is specified in the order and that is in the possession or control of the person when they receive the order. The judge would have to be satisfied that an offence has been or will be committed and that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the information will assist in the investigation of the offence. Since this provision would authorize the compulsion of information that could in certain circumstances engage a reasonable expectation of privacy, it may engage section 8 of the Charter.

The following considerations support the consistency of the amendments with section 8. The subscriber information sought does not by itself constitute particularly sensitive information, since it is limited to information that identifies clients and services, and does not include the contents of communications. The “reasonable grounds to suspect” standard is a recognized threshold for searches in the criminal context. The order would not be directed at the person who is under investigation for the offence for which evidence is being sought, and so would not require someone to incriminate themselves. The judge would have discretion as to whether to issue an order, and if they choose to issue an order, the judge would have discretion as to what information is specified in it. The person who receives the order would be able to challenge it, as with other production orders, in front of a justice or a judge, who would be able to revoke or vary the demand.

Voluntary or compelled provision of information

The bill would clarify, for greater certainty, that no production order, warrant, or confirmation of service demand is necessary for a police officer to receive or act on information if a person provides it voluntarily, or is required by law, including the law of a foreign state, to provide it. As this provision governs the circumstances under which police may obtain information, it may engage section 8 of the Charter.

The following considerations support the consistency of this provision with section 8. This provision clarifies that the production order, warrant and confirmation of service demand powers are not meant to displace the existing ability of police to receive information that is voluntarily provided to them by people lawfully in possession of it – for example, victims or witnesses of crime. Instances where persons voluntarily offer information lawfully in their possession to police do not involve state action that engages the Charter.

Publicly available information

The bill would clarify, for greater certainty, that no production order, warrant, or confirmation of service demand is necessary for a police officer to receive or act on information that is available to the public. As this provision governs the circumstances under which police may obtain information linked to a person, it may engage section 8 of the Charter.

The following considerations support the consistency of this provision with section 8. This provision clarifies that the production order, warrant and confirmation of service demand powers are not meant to displace the existing ability of police to receive, obtain and act upon information that is available to the public. Where information is available to the public, a person will usually have no reasonable expectation of privacy in it.

Request to foreign entity

The bill would allow a judge to authorize an officer to make a request to a foreign telecommunications service provider - or an entity that provides services by a means of telecommunication, such as a social media service provider - for transmission data or subscriber information. As with the production order described above, the judge would have to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence has been or will be committed and that the data or information would assist in the investigation of the offence. Since this provision could provide law enforcement with access to information that could be subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy, it may engage section 8 of the Charter.

The following considerations support the consistency of the amendments with section 8. The information sought - subscriber information and transmission data - does not by itself constitute particularly sensitive information. The “reasonable grounds to suspect” standard is a recognized threshold for searches in the criminal context. The judge would have discretion as to whether to issue an order, and if they choose to issue an order, the judge would have discretion as to what information is specified in it.

Exigent circumstances

The bill would extend the current ability of police officers to exercise certain powers without a warrant in situations where exigent circumstances make the obtaining of a warrant or production order impractical – for example, where the delay could lead to evidence being lost or to a threat to safety. This ability would be extended to include the power to seize subscriber information, transmission data and tracking data. Since these powers allow for the collection of information that could attract a reasonable expectation of privacy, they may engage section 8 of the Charter.

The following considerations support the consistency of these amendments with section 8. The power of police, in exigent circumstances, to conduct searches that would otherwise require a warrant has long been recognized at common law, and found reasonable under the Charter. The amendments would clarify that this power applies to the specific situation of seizures of subscriber information, transmission data and tracking data, which engage similar privacy interests to those already authorized under exigent circumstances.

Tracking device – similar things

The bill would amend the existing power regarding warrants for tracking devices. In cases where a tracking warrant relates to a thing that a person uses, carries or wears, the bill would allow a judge to authorize officers to obtain tracking data relating to a thing similar in nature and that is not known at the time that the warrant is issued, if the judge has reasonable grounds to suspect that the person will use, carry or wear that thing. The availability of this additional power is made necessary by the reality that a person may use, carry or wear different devices at different times, making it impractical to seek a new warrant each time a new device is discovered. The new power would allow the judge, at the time the initial warrant is issued, to reasonably craft its scope to include the tracking of things that are similar to the specific thing contemplated by the warrant. Since the power would allow the obtaining of information that could attract a reasonable expectation of privacy, it may engage section 8 of the Charter.

The following considerations support the consistency of the amendments with section 8. The additional authorization would, as with the existing tracking warrant power, have to be authorized by a judge on the basis of reasonable suspicion, which is a threshold recognized in caselaw for obtaining tracking data. The nature of the data being obtained, and the privacy interests at stake, are the same as those for the initial tracking warrant. Existing provisions in the Criminal Code which similarly allow for one general authorization to be given but which allow police to adjust based on changing circumstances have been upheld by courts in the more intrusive context of wiretap authorizations. These provisions allow police to intercept communications of a target at locations or with devices that were unknown when the authorization was issued.

Transmission data – means of telecommunication

The bill would amend the existing power regarding warrants for transmission data. Where a transmission data warrant relates to a means of telecommunication used by a person, the judge may, in the warrant, authorize officers to obtain transmission data that relates to other means of telecommunication that are similar in nature and that are unknown at the time the warrant is issued, where the judge has reasonable grounds to suspect that the person will use the other means of telecommunication. Since the power would allow the obtaining of information that could attract a reasonable expectation of privacy, it may engage section 8 of the Charter.

The following considerations support the consistency of the amendments with section 8. The additional authorization would, as with the initial warrant, have to be authorized by a judge on the basis of reasonable suspicion. The availability of this additional power is made necessary by the fact that a person may use multiple means of telecommunication at different times, making it impractical to seek a new warrant each time a new means of telecommunication is discovered. The nature of the data being obtained, and the privacy interests at stake, are the same as those for the initial transmission data warrant. Existing provisions in the Criminal Code which similarly allow for one general authorization to be given but which allow the police to adjust based on changing circumstances have been upheld by courts in the more intrusive context of wiretap authorizations. These provisions allow police to intercept communications of a target at locations or with devices that were unknown when the authorization was issued. 

Examination of computer data

The bill would allow a judge, in granting a search warrant, to authorize the examination of computer data seized under the warrant, or contained in or available to a computer system seized under the warrant. It would also allow a judge to issue a standalone warrant for examination of data contained in or available to a computer system that is already in the possession of police. In both cases, the judge would have to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the computer data will afford evidence with respect to the commission of an offence. Currently, police generally perform such examinations through applications for a search warrant under section 487 of the Criminal Code, which is primarily designed to authorize entry on to private premises and seizure of tangible property. As the examination of computer data could engage a reasonable expectation of privacy, it may engage section 8 of the Charter, which protects against unreasonable search and seizure.

The following considerations support the consistency of these amendments with section 8. Examination of computer data would be judicially authorized, in advance, on a “reasonable grounds to believe” standard, which is the default standard for authorizing searches in a criminal context. The judge would be able to impose any conditions that they consider advisable to ensure that the search is reasonable. This can limit the extent to which the investigators may be inadvertently exposed to data that is outside the scope of the warrant. Police would also have to provide a copy of the warrant to the owner or person in possession of the computer system, and the person under investigation whose data is being sought. This helps ensure an effective opportunity for these persons to challenge the warrant. A judge could extend the deadline for notice, up to three years, where such an extension would be in the interests of justice.

Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act

The bill would amend the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act to allow the Minister of Justice, on receipt of a request from a foreign state or entity for enforcement of a decision to compel the production of transmission data or subscriber information, to authorize a competent authority to make arrangements for the enforcement of that decision. The competent authority would have to apply ex parte to a judge for enforcement of the decision, and the judge would have to be satisfied that the relevant criteria were met under the Criminal Code provisions governing production orders for transmission data or subscriber information. Since these amendments would authorize the compulsion of information that could attract a reasonable expectation of privacy, they may engage section 8 of the Charter.

The following considerations support the consistency of the amendments with section 8. The amendments would preserve, for these foreign demands, the requirement in domestic law of prior judicial authorization, and the applicable threshold of reasonable suspicion for police to obtain this information.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act – Confirmation of Service Demands and Confirmation of Service Orders

The bill would amend the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to authorize CSIS, for the purpose of performing its functions under its security intelligence and foreign intelligence mandates, to make a demand to a telecommunications service provider, to confirm whether the person provides or has provided services to a particular subscriber, client, account or identifier. The amendments would also authorize CSIS, where a person fails to comply with a confirmation of service demand, to apply to a judge for an order to provide the information. As these powers would enable CSIS to obtain information linked to a person, the amendments may engage section 8 of the Charter.

The following considerations support the consistency of these amendments with section 8. The information sought would be limited to basic information about services provided, and would not reveal the contents of any communications, or any other details in relation to the services provided. For greater certainty, the demand could not be made if it would reveal medical information or information subject to solicitor-client privilege or the professional secrecy of advocates or notaries. The information provided would be used primarily as part of applications to obtain further warrants or production orders, pursuant to existing powers set out in the CSIS Act. The recipient of a demand would be able to challenge it in front of a judge, and would not be obliged to comply until a final decision is made. The confirmation of service demand power would only be available for the purpose of CSIS’s security intelligence and foreign intelligence mandates, and a judge would only be able to issue an information order where satisfied that the information would assist CSIS in performing its duties under those mandates.

Part 2 – Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act

Overview

Part 2 would establish a regulatory framework to support lawful access activities. Lawful access, which refers to the process by which law enforcement agencies and the CSIS use legally authorized powers to obtain information and assistance from electronic service providers (ESPs), is a tool used to support investigative and intelligence gathering activities at the federal, provincial and municipal levels. The bill would support activities conducted under existing legal authorities, which are found in the Criminal Code and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. The provisions would not grant any new authorities to lawfully access information and data or expand or derogate from any existing authorities for such access.

The framework introduced by the bill would aim to ensure that ESPs have the capabilities to give effect to existing authorities for national security and law enforcement agencies to access information. To do this, the bill would establish mandatory operational requirements for certain classes of ESPs, the “core providers”, to develop and maintain lawful access capabilities, including with respect to accessing certain data. It would also allow the Minister of Public Safety to issue ministerial orders to require an ESP to develop any obligation that may be contained in a regulation even if they are not a core provider. Before making an order, the Minister would be required to allow an opportunity for the affected ESP to make representations. The order would only be valid once it is approved by the Intelligence Commissioner.

Compliance with the new regulatory requirements, including ministerial orders, would be enforced by an administrative monetary penalty (AMP) regime, as well as offence provisions. The bill would also include several authorities to make regulations in order to support compliance with the new requirements under the Act, including with respect to record-keeping and reporting, as well as the confidentiality and security of information.

Non-disclosure of information regarding Ministerial Orders

The bill would prohibit ESPs from disclosing information about the existence or content of a ministerial order, as well as information regarding temporary exemptions, except as permitted under the Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act (the Act)or under the Canada Evidence Act. This would include information on which the Minister relied in making an order, as well as the existence of, or information disclosed in the course of, representations made by ESPs prior to the Minister having made an order. Disclosure of information contrary to the confidentiality requirements of the Act would constitute a violation or an offence, for which a person could be liable to a fine (see below). Because the Act would place limits on what persons could communicate to others, it engages the right to freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.

The following considerations support the consistency of the non-disclosure provisions with the Charter. These provisions pursue the important objective of protecting sensitive capacity-related information regarding certain technical operations of certain targeted ESPs, which by extension, would provide insight into the interests, capacity, and limitations of law enforcement and national security agencies. To achieve this objective, the provisions would place limits on communication about the technical capabilities of ESPs, which are commercial entities. While restrictions on commercial speech can engage the right to freedom of expression, they usually do not implicate the core values of the right. These include the search for political, artistic and scientific truth, the protection of individual autonomy and self-development, and the promotion of public participation in the democratic process. Rather, the restrictions would be narrowly focused on the existence and contents of orders and exemptions, all linked to the objective of protecting sensitive information. Limits on expression that do not engage the core values of the right are more easily justified.

Inspection and production powers

The bill would authorize designated persons to enter places and conduct inspections, at any reasonable time, for the purpose of verifying compliance or preventing non-compliance with the Act or regulations. Prior to entering a place, the bill would require that designated persons have reasonable grounds to believe that anything relevant to verification or prevention is located in that place, or that an activity regulated by the Act is conducted in that place. The provisions would also authorize the Minister or a designated person to make an order requiring an ESP to conduct an internal audit for the purpose of verifying compliance or preventing non-compliance with the Act, and to provide a report with the results of the audit, including if the ESP determines there is non-compliance. The power to enter and inspect places, and the requirement for ESPs to provide information to designated persons, may engage section 8 of the Charter.

The following considerations support the consistency of the provisions with section 8. Privacy interests are diminished in the regulatory and administrative contexts. The powers would be available for the regulatory purpose of verifying compliance and preventing non-compliance with the Act. Further, information gathered in this context would generally relate to technical capabilities of ESPs, which would not attract a heightened privacy interest. In addition, the powers would not be available for the purpose of advancing a criminal investigation. The proposed powers are similar to regulatory inspection powers that have been upheld in other contexts.

Offences and Administrative Monetary Penalties (AMPs)

The bill includes an administrative penalty regime for violations of certain provisions of the Act or regulations. If a designated person has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has committed a violation, they may issue a notice of violation. The amount of a penalty is to be established in accordance with the regulations, however the Act would limit the maximum amount of an AMP to $50,000 for an individual and $250,000 for a corporation or other non-natural person for each violation.  This said, each day a violation is committed or continued constitutes a separate violation.  Opting to issue an AMP for a contravention of the Act would preclude prosecuting that contravention as an offence, and vice-versa.

The following considerations support the consistency of the AMP regime with section 11 of the Charter. The penalty regime would be administrative in nature, and its penalties would not have “true penal consequences.” The bill would specify that the purpose of the penalties would be to promote compliance with the Act and regulations, and not to “punish”. Further, the AMPs would not be subject to a mandatory minimum fine, and as an alternative to paying the penalty, an individual could request to enter into a compliance agreement with the Minister, which could include reducing the penalty in part or in whole. The possibility that a substantial monetary penalty may be imposed does not engage section 11. Properly construed and enforced, this new regime would not allow penalties with “true penal consequences.”

In addition, the bill would make it an offence to contravene specified provisions of the Act or regulations. These include, for example, summary offences for contravening a ministerial or compliance order, failing to comply with inspection and audit requirements, and disclosing confidential information. For the purpose of these offences, individuals may be liable for acts or omissions committed by an employee or agent or mandatary. Further, directors, officers or agents may be liable for an offence committed by a corporation or other non-natural person if they “directed, authorized, assented to, acquiesced in, or participated in” the commission of an offence. Upon conviction, the offences would be punishable by a maximum amount of $100,000 in the case of an individual, and $500,000 for a corporation or other non-natural person. A person would not be found guilty of these offences if they establish that they exercised due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence.

Further, the bill would make it an offence to knowingly obstruct or hinder persons carrying out their functions or duties under the Act, or to knowingly make a false statement to any such person. A person who is found guilty of an obstruction or false statement offence would be liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than $25,000 for an individual (or $50,000 for each subsequent offence), and $100,000 for a corporation or other non-natural person (or $250,000 for each subsequent offence).

A person who is liable to a fine under the offence provisions of the Act would be subject to charges and proceedings that could engage rights under section 11 of the Charter. In particular, liability for the actions of employees, agents and mandataries could engage section 11(d) of the Charter, which guarantees fair trial rights.

The following considerations support the consistency of the offences with section 11(d). The offences are not punishable by imprisonment. They are regulatory in nature, as opposed to “true crimes”, which are crimes that refer to inherently morally blameworthy behaviour that require proof of a corresponding degree of fault. While a person could be liable for the actions of an employee, agent or mandatary, they are able to raise as a defence that they exercised due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence.